The ability to recognize quickly inside network flows to be executable is prerequisite for malware detection. For this purpose, we introduce an instruction transition probability matrix (ITPX) which is comprised of the IA-32 instruction sets and reveals the characteristics of executable code's instruction transition patterns. And then, we propose a simple al-
gorithm to detect executable code inside network flows using a reference ITPX which is learned from the known Windows Portable Executable files. We have tested the algorithm with more than thousands of executable and non-executable codes. The results show that it is very promising enough to use in real world. key words: executable code, malware detection, IA-32 Instruction where n is from 1 to (length (payload)-MDR) and yi's are the observed ith instruction transitions of nth chunk of an IP packet. From the assumption, individual observation yi's are statistically independent of one another, and we estimate EES by the log function for computational convenience [7] as follows, log_EESn=-n+MDR-1ƒ°k=n1n pki, j,
where pki, j is the corresponding Pi , j in Eq. (1) of the reference ITPX when the k-th instruction is i and the (k+1)-th instruction is j. We note that we choose MDR=50 according to the general size of shellcodes of which very short execuuable codes. Even if many threshold-based anomaly intrusion detections have the trouble do deal with their high false alarm rate, we also use this well-studied method in this letter. Histogram of the Expectation of Executable Sequence (log_EES) for the learning Windows PE files. Table 1 False negative and false positive for each file type when the threshold is based on 90% reliability. another delivered a text file, respectively. From Fig. 3 , we note that there is no executable chunk in the FTP stream for text file, while we can see about 80% the executable chunks in the packets of the sequence number between 48 and 80 of the FTP stream delivering Windows PE file. We also verithat the packet sequence numbers of executable part of the graph in Fig. 3 are identical to the txt section of PE executable file.
In the second experiment, we used a real worm dump file -the Blaster worm -which exploits the RPC DCOM vulnerability in Windows OS. These captured packets are composed of bidirectional 824 packets, where the shellcodes of the exploit are delivered to the target system on TCP 445 port, and then the worm file -blaster. exeis delivered to victim system using a UDP TFTP service like a typical propagation scenario of a malware. As shown in Fig. 4 , we can confirm that our proposed mechanism can recognize not only the executable part of the PE file but also the executable part of shellcode of the exploits in the network packet. 
